The EU\u27s reform in rules of origin and international trade : evidence from Cambodia by Tanaka Kiyoyasu
The EU's reform in rules of origin and
international trade : evidence from Cambodia
著者 Tanaka Kiyoyasu
権利 Copyrights 2020 by author(s)
journal or
publication title
IDE Discussion Paper
volume 770
year 2020-03
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/00051602
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
  
IDE Discussion Papers are preliminary materials circulated  
to stimulate discussions and critical comments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Rules of origin, GSP, trade, FDI, Cambodia, EU 
JEL classification: F13, F14, F15, O14, O24 
  
* Research Fellow, Economic Integration Study Group, Development Studies Center, 
IDE (kiyoyasu_tanaka@ide.go.jp)  
IDE DISCUSSION PAPER No. 770 
 
The EU’s Reform in Rules of Origin and 
International Trade: Evidence from Cambodia 
 
Kiyoyasu TANAKA* 
 
March 2020 
Abstract  
The European Union (EU) has unilaterally granted developing countries with preferential 
access to the EU markets under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). To obtain 
preferential access, exporters in beneficiary countries must follow rules of origin (ROO) in the 
EU’s GSP. The previous ROO were criticized as restrictive because production costs increase 
with a restriction on imported inputs from the lowest-cost third countries and the 
administrative process of proving origin. To simplify the restrictive ROO, the EU’s reform 
process started in 2003, and a new regulation came into force on January 1, 2011. This paper 
estimates the causal impact of simplifying ROO on garment exports in a beneficiary country, 
Cambodia, during the period 2007-2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute merged 
with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  The 
Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and related 
affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the Middle East, 
Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2020 by author(s) 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
author(s).
3 
 
 
The EU’s Reform in Rules of Origin and International Trade: 
Evidence from Cambodia† 
 
Kiyoyasu Tanaka§ 
(Institute of Developing Economies) 
March 2020 
 
Abstract 
The European Union (EU) has unilaterally granted developing countries with preferential access 
to the EU markets under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). To obtain preferential 
access, exporters in beneficiary countries must follow rules of origin (ROO) in the EU’s GSP. 
The previous ROO were criticized as restrictive because production costs increase with a 
restriction on imported inputs from the lowest-cost third countries and the administrative process 
of proving origin. To simplify the restrictive ROO, the EU’s reform process started in 2003, and 
a new regulation came into force on January 1, 2011. However, the impact of the EU’s reform on 
beneficiary economies remains largely unexplored. This paper estimates the causal impact of 
simplifying ROO on garment exports in a beneficiary country, Cambodia, during the period 2007-
2015. In the new ROO, garment exporters in least developing beneficiaries such as Cambodia can 
use imported fabric from any third country and still maintain preferential access. I adopt a 
difference-in-differences method and provide evidence to support the parallel trends assumption. 
I find that garment exports to the EU increased by 112% after 2011, which coincided with a sharp 
increase in textile imports from China to Cambodia. FDI inflows increased sharply after 2011 in 
a garment sector, but decreased in a textile sector. Thus, simplifying ROO in GSP programs should 
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1. Introduction 
Preferential trade access to developed economies helps to promote an export industry in 
developing economies. By reducing duties on import in developed economies in favor of 
developing economies, trade preferences increase export earnings and investment, thereby 
contributing to poverty reduction and sustainable development. Since the Generalized System of 
Preferences (GSP) was introduced in the 1970s, the GSP programs were considered to produce 
uneven effects on export success in favor of richer developing economies (Brenton, 2003). To 
support least developing countries (LDCs), the European Union (EU) introduced the Everything 
But Arms (EBA) initiative in 2001. However, expected benefits were not fully realized at the 
outset. In 2001, exports to EU from EBA beneficiary countries were 6.18 trillion EURO, but 
exports to EU requesting preferential access were merely 4.20 trillion EURO. Only 68.0% of 
exports from EBA beneficiaries requested duty-free access (EUROSTAT).1 
Stringent rules of origin (ROO) in the EU GSP had been considered as a key reason for the 
low utilization rate of trade preferences. The cost of complying with the origin requirements may 
exceed the benefit of using preferential access because production costs increase with a  
restriction on imported inputs from the lowest-cost third countries and the administrative process 
of proving origin (Brenton and Manchin, 2003). In 2003, the European Commission (EC) 
launched consultation processes on origin requirement issues to assess various interests at stake 
from EU members, private sectors, industry associations, and civil society. Following a series of 
internal debates with stakeholders, the EC adopted a new regulation to simplify the restrictive 
origin requirements under the EU GSP on November 18, 2010. The new regulation came into 
effective on January 1, 2011. Consequently, exports from EBA beneficiaries to EU requesting 
preferential access increased substantially from 9.41 trillion EURO in 2010 to 13.3 trillion EURO 
in 2011, with a sharp increase in the utilization rate from 84.3% to 93.7%. 
In this paper, I seek to assess the effects of the EU’s reform in the GSP’s ROO on trade and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in a beneficiary country by addressing three interrelated questions. 
(i) Does simplifying ROO have a causal impact on exports to the EU markets? (ii) What is the 
consequent impact on imports of intermediate inputs? (iii) How did the reform affect inward FDI? 
These questions are critical to assess the policy objectives in GSP programs because preferential 
market access aims to support the participation of developing economies into the world trading 
system (Cadot and de Melo, 2007). However, there is limited empirical work to assess how 
simplifying ROO in GSP programs promote trade and investment in LDCs. This paper 
empirically evaluates the role of ROO in GSP programs on the beneficiary country. 
                                                   
1  Using the Eurostat data, I aggregate the import of good for final use in the EU eligible for 
GSP/preferential tariffs from EBA beneficiary countries except for Myanmar and calculate a share of 
the import actually entered under preferential regimes. 
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To examine these questions, I focus on garment exports because knitted and woven garments 
are major export products from EBA beneficiaries to EU. These products accounted for 61.0% of 
the total exports to EU requesting preferential access in 2010. Moreover, I focus on Cambodia for 
analysis because the previous ROO were considered as restrictive for the garment sector in 
Cambodia. In general, the previous ROO in the EU GSP stipulates that garment producers in 
Cambodia must use domestically produced fabric and/or imported fabric from EU/ASEAN 
countries in certain conditions to qualify for duty-free access to EU. Meanwhile, garment 
producers used mainly imported fabric from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea 
because domestic textile production was severely limited (Asuyama et al., 2013; Bargawi, 2005; 
Yamagata, 2006). Under the new ROO, garment exporters in LDCs such as Cambodia can use 
imported fabric from any third country and still maintain preferential access. Because fabric 
manufacture is not required, the origin requirement was relaxed from two-stage processing to 
one-stage processing (UNCTAD, 2013). Additionally, the reform processes of origin rules 
applicable to the EU GSP suggest that Cambodia had no direct influence in determining specific 
revisions in the GSP’s ROO. In this respect, the EU’s reform in ROO is an exogenous policy 
change for garment exporters in Cambodia, providing an ideal natural experiment to identify a 
causal effect of ROO on trade. 
This paper adopts a difference-in-differences (DD) method based on a standard gravity 
model of international trade. For identification, I exploit two sources of variations in garment 
exports: (i) a difference between exports to EU markets (treatment groups) and exports to non-
EU markets (control groups); (ii) a difference in exports before and after the EU’s reform in 2011. 
By comparing changes in exports to EU markets before and after 2011 with changes in exports to 
non-EU markets before and after 2011, I seek to identify a causal effect of simple ROO on garment 
exports. The identification for the DD method relies crucially on the assumption that both exports 
to the EU and to non-EU markets would exhibit parallel trends in the absence of the reform. 
Without the reform, export trends would need to move in tandem between treatment and control 
groups. To assess this assumption, I that garment export trends for treatment and control groups 
exhibit similar export trends in the pre-reform period before 2011. After 2011, the treatment group 
shows a sharp increase in the export whereas the control group does not exhibit any apparent 
change in the export. The graphical evidence supports the validity of the parallel trends 
assumption for identification. 
To shed light on consequent effects of the export expansion due to the EU’s reform, I 
examine imported intermediate inputs and inward FDI in Cambodia. In the wake of the reform, 
garment producers in Cambodia could use imported fabric from any market to qualify for 
preferential access to EU. As described in Natsuda et al. (2010) and Staritz (2011), China is a key 
import market for yarn, fabric, and accessories used for garment production in Cambodia. This 
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suggests that the reform could bring about a large expansion of sourcing from highly competitive 
textile industries in China. To examine this implication, I describe a trend in imported textiles in 
Cambodia and estimate the extent to which textile imports from China increased after 2011. 
In terms of investment effects, the EU’s reform may encourage foreign investors in a garment 
sector, but discourage those in a textile sector. The reform improved input sourcing flexibility for 
garment manufacture in Cambodia to benefit from preferential market access. As discussed in 
Krishna (2006), the removal of the binding ROO allows producers to use the best mix of inputs 
to minimize the level of production costs. A decline in the unit cost of local production may 
strengthen an incentive for foreign investors to produce garment products in Cambodia. 
Meanwhile, garment exporters do not need to use locally produced textiles for preferential access, 
thereby reducing an incentive for foreign investors to produce textile inputs in a local market. 
Thus, inward FDI flows after 2011 would increase for the garment sector and decrease for the 
textile sector. 
Main findings are summarized as follows. First, the total export in knitted and woven 
garments to the EU markets increased significantly by 112% after 2011. In the larger EU markets, 
the garment exports increased by 219%. Robust to alternative specifications, the results point to 
the positive causal impact of the EU’s reform on garment exports in Cambodia. The export trends 
in EU and non-EU markets support that the estimated impacts of the reform should be a causal 
effect in a DID estimation. There is little evidence of trade substitution effects because redirection 
of exports to non-EU markets would not account quantitatively for the export expansion. The 
export price of garment products from Cambodia to EU declined significantly after 2011, 
suggesting that the bulk of the export impacts represents a quantity increase. Export variety also 
significantly increased for the larger EU markets. Second, Cambodia’s textile imports such as 
fabric from China increased significantly by 90% after 2011. The result is consistent with the 
hypothesis that simplifying ROO in the EU GSP encouraged the use of competitively priced 
inputs to qualify for preferential access. Additionally, FDI inflows in a garment sector increased 
by 153% after 2011, whereas FDI inflows in a textile sector decreased by 68%. These results 
suggest that greater flexible sourcing to obtain preferential access improves an investment climate 
for foreign investors in the garment sector, but removes an incentive for foreign investors to 
engage in local textile production. Taken together, the EU’s reform in ROO brought about a 
substantial impact on trade and inward FDI in Cambodia. 
This paper contributes to related literature in several manners. Prior work on a relationship 
between ROO and trade flows is closely related to this paper.2 Augier et al. (2004) exploit the 
                                                   
2 Inama (2009) provides a comprehensive account of ROO issues from both academic and policy 
perspectives. Cadot et al. (2006) provide a collection of related papers on ROO issues in regional trade 
agreements. 
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Pan-European Cumulation System (PECS) in 1997 as a natural experiment to estimate the impact 
of greater sourcing flexibility on textile exports in the southern Mediterranean countries. Augier 
et al. (2005) adopt a DD method to examine whether the introduction of cumulation rules affects 
bilateral trade flows in manufacturing and intermediate goods. Additionally, Andersson (2016) 
exploits the introduction of southern Mediterranean countries in the PECS for the middle 2000s 
to investigate the impact of better access to foreign intermediate inputs on final-goods export in 
these countries. While these studies generally show a positive effect of more liberal ROO on trade 
flows, a plausible concern is an endogeneity issue because countries and industries with greater 
economic interests could influence an institutional change in rules of cumulation. By contrast, I 
argue that Cambodia had no direct influence in the reform processes of origin rules applicable to 
EU GSP, so that the EU’s reform is plausibly as an exogenous policy shock to garment exports in 
Cambodia. By focusing on a small beneficiary country, I can better identify a causal effect of 
ROO on trade flows.3 
An alternative approach in the literature is to measure the restrictiveness of ROO as a 
categorical index (Estevadeordal, 2000; Estevadeordal and Suominen, 2004). Such an index is 
constructed at the product level based on the origin-conferring criteria such as a change in tariff 
classification, a regional value content, and technical requirements, with the larger values 
indicating more stringent origin requirements. Based on this approach, Anson et al. (2005) shows 
a negative relationship between the ROO index and trade flows. Conconi et al. (2018) show that 
the NAFTA ROO on final goods decreased the growth rate of intermediate inputs in Mexico from 
third countries relative to NAFTA partners. However, Inama (2009) points out difficulties in this 
approach because similar drafting styles of rules may imply considerably different levels of 
restrictiveness for actual production chains. Specifically, the specific origin requirements may be 
restrictive for exporting countries that rely heavily on imported inputs, but may be liberal for other 
countries with extensive domestic supply chains. In this respect, this paper focuses on a clear 
change in the origin requirements from two-stage processing to one-stage processing for garment 
production in Cambodia, thereby reducing possible measurement errors inherently involved in 
mapping the complex origin-conferring criteria into the categorical index. 
My empirical strategy exploiting a change in ROO is similar to the analysis in de Melo and 
Portugal-Perez (2013), but differs in an important dimension. 4  Specifically, they exploit a 
difference in ROO between U.S. and EU preferential regimes during the period 1996-2004; some 
African countries could use fabric of any origin to obtain preferential treatment under the U.S. 
                                                   
3 Curran and Nadvi (2015) argue that a change in ROO was a key reason for a sharp increase in 
garment exports from Bangladesh to EU after 2011. However, their analysis is limited to descriptive 
statistics. 
4 Hayakawa (2019) exploits a change in ROO for knitted garments in 2015 under the Japanese GSP 
to investigate the impact on a share of import flows in Japan across multiple preference regimes. 
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Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), but must meet double transformation for preferential 
access to EU.5 However, different preferential regimes induce an endogenous export response, 
as AGOA encouraged Asian firms to invest in African beneficiary countries for duty-free access 
to the U.S. market (Lall, 2005; Phelps et al., 2009). By sourcing inputs from Asia, they exported 
the large volume of simple garment products to improve manufacturing efficiency (Morris and 
Staritz, 2014). Meanwhile, I exploit a change in ROO of the EU’s GSP to alleviate a possible 
endogeneity bias arising from a comparison of different exporting countries under different 
preferential regimes. 
Taken together, the main contribution of this paper is to identify a causal impact of ROO on 
trade by exploiting the EU’s reform as a natural experiment. My empirical strategy helps to 
alleviate an endogeneity bias in ROO arising from a political-economy motivation of ROO 
changes and a measurement error in quantifying the restrictiveness of ROO. Additionally, I extend 
the literature by demonstrating that the export expansion due to simple ROO has consequent 
impacts on intermediate input imports and FDI inflows in a beneficiary country. Thus, this paper 
presents credible evidence from Cambodia to assess the policy objectives in trade preferences 
granted by developed countries for development. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents background on the EU’s 
reform in ROO. Section 3 provides an empirical framework to estimate the impact of the EU’s 
reform in ROO on exports, with data description. In section 4, I check a parallel trends assumption 
for identification in a DD method, and discuss the estimation results and robustness checks. 
Section 5 discusses the impact on imported intermediate inputs for garment manufacture. Section 
6 discusses the impact on inward FDI. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background 
This section presents a brief summary of the EU GSP and the origin-conferring criteria for 
preferential market access, followed by a review of the EU’s reform processes in the GSP’s ROO. 
Finally, I discuss implications of the reform for garment export in Cambodia. 
 
2.1.  The European Union’s Trade Preferences 
The EU has unilaterally granted developing countries with preferential access to EU markets 
under the EU GSP since 1971.6 The provision of preferential access aims to promote sustainable 
                                                   
5 While Frazer and Van Biesebroeck (2010) and Ito and Aoyagi (2019) estimate the impact of duty-
free access on imports in the U.S. and Japan, respectively, but they do not explicitly analyze origin 
requirements. 
6 Not all developing countries have been eligible for the EU GSP and the EU may suspend the GSP 
status. For instance, GSP preferences were withdrawn from Myanmar/Burma in 1997 and reinstated 
for application from June 13, 2012. 
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development and good governance in developing countries through international trade. To be 
consistent with a multilateral trading agreement, the GSP was introduced under the Enabling 
Clause, which allows an exception to the Most-Favored Nation (MFN) principle in the WTO law.  
The EC describes three preferential trade schemes under the EU GSP as of December 2015 
(European Commission, 2016).7 First, the standard GSP grants low or lower-middle income 
countries with duty reductions for 66% of all EU tariff lines. Second, the special incentive 
arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the so-called ‘GSP+’, grants 
duty-free access in the same 66% tariff lines as the standard GSP for countries with vulnerable 
economic structures. Beneficiary countries are in return required to follow international 
conventions such as human and labor rights, environmental protection, and good governance. 
Third, the EBA arrangement was introduced in 2001 to grant LDCs with duty-free and quota-free 
access for all tariff lines except for arms and ammunition.8 Brenton (2003) highlights that trade 
preferences under the EBA are granted for an unlimited period and not subject to periodic review, 
thereby substantially improving the certainty of preferential market access for beneficiaries. 
While preferential trade access is given only to products originating from beneficiary 
countries, it may cause trade deflection in which products originating from non-beneficiary 
countries are transshipped to EU markets through beneficiary countries.9 Traders can avoid the 
payment of higher tariffs imposed on products originating from non-beneficiary countries. To 
prevent such trade deflection, preferential arrangements stipulate the conditions under which a 
product must meet to qualify for preferential access. Thus, ROO are established to address a 
legitimate concern of the trade deflection. 
Under the EU GSP, there are general conditions to determine origin of products (UNCTAD, 
2013). First, products wholly obtained in a beneficiary country are considered as originating in 
the country. Examples include mineral products extracted from its soil, plants and vegetable 
products grown there, and live animals born and raised there. Wholly obtained products are 
produced without using imported input. Second, if products are manufactured using imported 
inputs, these non-originating materials must be sufficiently worked or processed to satisfy origin-
determining criteria. Origin-determining requirements for not wholly obtained products are 
generally based on a change of tariff heading, addition of domestic value, and specific processing 
requirements. Additionally, rules of cumulation allow beneficiary countries to consider inputs 
                                                   
7 In addition to the GSP regime, the EU has granted trade preferences to African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific (ACP) countries and Mediterranean countries. See Persson and Wilhelmsson (2016) for a brief 
review of these regimes. 
8 Liberalization came into effect immediately except for gradual reductions to zero tariffs for bananas 
in 2006 and for rice and sugar for 2009. 
9  Rotunno et al. (2013) show that liberal ROO under AGOA may allow for a large volume of 
transshipment from China in Africa’s garment exports to the U.S. market. 
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from other countries as originating content.10 
The previous ROO under the EU GSP had been considered as restrictive, thereby leading to 
the low utilization rate of EU trade preferences. Brenton and Manchin (2003) argue that product-
specific origin requirements are stringent by restricting the use of imported input from the lowest-
cost third countries. Such stringent rules may be further complicated by the potentially high costs 
of proving origin, including documentation procedures and accounting systems. In the previous 
ROO, garment products must be made from domestically manufactured fabric or imported fabric 
from EU. Although rules of cumulation allow for the use of qualifying inputs from other countries, 
two-stage processing requirements generally restricts the use of imported fabric from third 
countries. Consequently, stringent ROO increase the cost of complying with the ROO, which may 
exceed the benefits of using preferential access. 
 
2.2.  The EU’s Reform in Rules of Origin 
In 2003, the EC adopted a Green Paper on ‘the future of rules of origin in preferential trade 
arrangements’ to evaluate the issues in the GSP’s ROO. The consultation process was launched 
to assess various interests at stake from EU members, private sectors, industry associations, and 
civil society. The findings show that the previous ROO were too complex and restrictive to fit 
global manufacturing processes, thereby giving a call for simplification and relaxation of the 
origin rules and procedures. In 2005, the EC adopted a communication on ‘the rules of origin in 
preferential trade arrangements: orientations for the future’. By setting general principles of 
simplification and development-friendliness, the EC supported a draft regulation for a reform of 
the ROO in the EU GSP. 
In summarizing the background of the reform processes, Inama (2011) explains that the EC 
proposed a value-added criterion in the origin-determining criteria as a method to evaluate 
sufficient processing across the board for most products. This approach was in contrast with the 
previously used criteria based on a change of tariff heading, a maximum allowance of non-
originating materials, and specific processing requirements. However, this proposal was met by 
strong oppositions from stakeholders such as the consulted European Federations representing 
agricultural and industrial interests. Consequently, the reform processes followed a series of 
internal debates and discussions with stakeholders for a long period. 
On November 18, 2010, the EC adopted a new regulation on the ROO for the EU GSP. This 
regulation came into effective on January 1, 2011.11 Three major changes in the new regulation 
                                                   
10 Other provisions stipulate the conditions of origin determination related to insufficient working or 
processing, working or processing outside the territory of beneficiary countries, and non-manipulation 
principle. 
11 For details, see Commission Regulation (EU) No. 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down provisions for the implementation of Council Regulation 
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are pointed out by Inama (2011). First, product-specific origin requirements are relaxed for a 
number of products, with more lenient treatment for LDCs than developing beneficiary countries. 
The tolerance rule is relaxed with an increase from 10% to 15% for agricultural products in terms 
of the weight and for manufacture products in terms of the ex-works price. Second, rules of 
cumulation include Mercosur and the allocation rule of origin among regional partners is relaxed. 
Extended cumulation is applied to EU free trade agreement (FTA) partner countries under certain 
conditions. Finally, the system of registered exporters and self-certification are introduced, which 
became effective on January 1, 2017. 
 
2.3.  Implications for Garment Export in Cambodia 
Garment product has been a leading export commodity in the Cambodian economy for recent 
decades. Garment exports in HS Chapters 61 and 62 accounted for 69.3% of total commodity 
exports in 2000, which subsequently increased to 77.7% in 2014. The garment exports amounted 
to 5.31 billion USD in 2014, where the EU and U.S. markets accounted for 40.7% and 34.3% of 
the total garment exports, respectively (UN COMTRADE). 
Cambodia is a beneficiary country under the EBA regime since 2001. In the previous ROO, 
originating status is given to garment products manufactured using domestically produced fabric 
in Cambodia. Manufacturing fabric from yarn or natural fibers is required. Although rules of 
cumulation allowed for the use of imported fabric from EU or ASEAN, garment producers in 
Cambodia must add the larger value added in garment production than the highest customs value 
of any of imported materials to benefit from regional cumulation.12 Since domestic production 
capacity of textiles was limited, most garment producers exploited mainly imported materials 
from major textile exporters such as China, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan (Bargawi, 
2005; Yamagata, 2006). The garment products manufactured from fabric in these countries were 
not qualified for EU preferential access under the previous ROO.  
The new regulation in the ROO came into effective on January 1, 2011. The use of imported 
fabric produced anywhere is allowed for garment products originating in Cambodia. Because 
local manufacture of fabric is not required, the origin requirement is relaxed from two-stage 
processing to one-stage processing (UNCTAD, 2013). These changes are summarized in Table 1. 
The new ROO in the EU GSP has a significant implication for garment exports to EU in Cambodia. 
As a simple check, Figure 1 presents the utilization rate as measured by a share of duty-free import 
                                                   
(EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code. 
12 The EC granted the derogations from the GSP ROO for certain textile products originating from 
Cambodia, which allowed for the use of woven fabric (woven items) or yarn (knitted items) imported 
from countries belonging to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) or to the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EC Partnership Agreement under certain quantitative 
restrictions. For details, see the Commission Regulations (EU) No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010. 
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in the total import that entered EU markets under duty-free and MFN rates (EUROSTAT). The 
utilization rate for knitted garments increased sharply from 72% in 2010 to 89% in 2011, whereas 
the utilization rate for woven garments increased more substantially from 56% in 2010 to 89% in 
2011. 
[Table 1 and Figure 1 here] 
Another implication for analysis is that Cambodia played little role in the reform process of 
origin rules applicable to EU GSP. While the low utilization of EU trade preferences in export 
from developing countries provided a motivation for the reform, it is documented that domestic 
stakeholders in the EU yielded a dominant influence on the reform process, as described in Inama 
(2011). Cambodia could not yield a strong political influence on policy-making processes in the 
EU. This view is indeed reflected in the policy report by the Royal Government of Cambodia 
(2014, p. 44) as follows. “The rules of origin applicable to GSP and DFQF (duty-free quota-free) 
programs are determined unilaterally by the countries offering Cambodia those programs. 
Cambodia has no influence over these rules, except through moral suasion.”13 
Origin-conferring criteria are also relaxed for other products, including fishery products, 
leather products, electrical machinery, motorcycles, and bicycles. The reform in product-specific 
origin requirements is not limited to garment products, which are the most significant export 
commodities in Cambodia. In this respect, it is reasonable to consider that Cambodia had no direct 
influence in determining the product-specific origin requirements in EU GSP. Thus, I argue that 
the EU’s reform in ROO is an exogenous policy shock to garment exports in Cambodia, providing 
an ideal natural experiment to identify a causal effect of simple ROO on exports. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
In this section, I discuss a theoretical relationship between liberal origin requirements and 
export. I describe an empirical framework to assess the causal impact of the EU’s reform in ROO 
on garment exports from Cambodia, followed by data description. 
 
3.1.  Liberal Rules of Origin and Export 
To examine a linkage between liberal ROO and export, a starting point is to distinguish 
between non-binding and binding ROO for garment export during the pre-reform period. In the 
case of the non-binding ROO, garment producers already satisfy the product-specific origin 
requirements in the EU GSP to qualify for duty-free access to the EU markets. This implies that 
more liberal ROO during the post-reform period would not affect export decisions for the garment 
                                                   
13 While the report also implies that Cambodia seeks to leverage its moral suasion to draw an attention 
to the need to improve DFQF programs, there is little evidence for its effective influence on the EU’s 
reform process in ROO. 
13 
 
producers. However, the previous ROO required that garment producers in Cambodia use 
domestically produced fabric and/or fabric imported from the EU or ASEAN countries in certain 
conditions to obtain duty-free access to the EU markets. Some Cambodian garment producers did 
not utilize the preferential access because textiles from EU and ASEAN sources were not cost 
effective as compared with those from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea (Bargawi, 
2005; Yamagata, 2006). As domestic production of competitively priced textiles was limited, 
input sourcing was a fundamental constraint on garment production in Cambodia.14 Thus, many 
garment producers would need to rely importantly on imported textiles, making the non-binding 
case unlikely to hold for garment manufacture in Cambodia. 
Origin requirements for preferential treatment are binding for producers when the origin-
conferring criteria prevent them from using the most competitively priced inputs from third 
markets. As discussed in Krishna (2006), producers can use the best mix of inputs to minimize 
the level of production costs when the choice of inputs is not restricted. However, the binding 
ROO constrain the choice of inputs used in manufacturing processes, so that the unit cost of 
production must increase with the restrictiveness of the origin requirements. Additionally, 
producers must obtain a certificate of origin to prove that their products meet the origin 
requirements. This procedure involves documentation of sourcing to keep track of the origin of 
inputs and their usage. Thus, the binding ROO would generally increase the production costs for 
producers. 
In the binding case, the decision to export under preferential treatment also depends not only 
on the cost of meeting specific origin requirements, but on the margin of preference for export 
products in the foreign markets, i.e., the absolute difference between the MFN rate of duty and 
the preferential rate of duty. In the case of garment exporters in Cambodia, the average MFN tariff 
rates on garment products in the EU markets are 12%, implying that duty-free access gives the 
preferential margin of 12%. As is formally modelled in Demidova et al. (2012), exporters can 
choose not to use preferential access, but to pay the MFN tariff. They do not need to incur the 
costs of meeting ROO, but they do not benefit from the preferential margin. If the costs of meeting 
ROO exceed the benefit of the preferential margin, they would pay the MFN tariff to export. Thus, 
more liberal ROO during the post-reform period would induce a higher fraction of potential 
exporters to use preferential access, rather than to pay the MFN tariff.15 
Taken together, these discussions suggest that liberal ROO after the EU’s reform in 2011 
allowed garment producers to use the most competitively priced inputs from third markets, 
thereby reducing production costs of garment manufacture in Cambodia. Because garment 
                                                   
14 Asuyama et al., (2013) report that material inputs accounted for 45.6% of the gross product for 
garment firms in 2002. 
15 Since firm-destination-level data on export in Cambodia are not available, it is not possible to 
evaluate trade adjustments at the extensive and intensive margin for individual firms. 
14 
 
producers in Cambodia were likely to face the binding ROO in the EU GSP during the pre-reform 
period, more liberal ROO should increase garment exports from Cambodia to the EU markets 
under duty-free treatment. This prediction is consistent with a sharp increase in the utilization rate 
of duty-free access for garment imports in the EU markets from Cambodia after 2011 in Figure 1. 
 
3.2.  Empirical Specification 
To estimate the impact of the EU’s reform in ROO on export, I specify a following model 
for export market i, export product j, and year t: ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝒁𝒁′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜷𝜷2 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖             (1) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the value of knitted or woven garment exports from Cambodia to export market 
i.16 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for EU markets, and zero otherwise. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is 
a dummy variable that takes on unity after the year 2011, and zero otherwise. An interaction term 
between 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 takes on unity for EU markets after 2011, and zero otherwise. 𝒁𝒁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is 
a vector of variables on export-market characteristics, such as GDP, GDP per capita, and product-
specific tariff rates. Since Cambodia participated in regional trade agreements (RTAs) during the 
sample period, a dummy variable for new RTAs is included.17 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 is a country-level fixed effect 
to control for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a time-varying product-
level fixed effect to control for time-varying product-specific unobserved characteristics and 
aggregate shocks of global and domestic economies on exports across years. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is an 
error term. 
𝛽𝛽1 is the coefficient of my main interest. As explained previously, the EU introduced new 
ROO in 2011 to grant duty-free access to EU markets for garment producers in beneficiary 
countries that manufacture garment products using imported fabric from anywhere. Since 
imported fabric from the lowest-cost markets helps to reduce the cost of garment manufacture in 
Cambodia, the change in EU ROO should increase garment exports from Cambodia. Thus, I 
predict that 𝛽𝛽1 should be positive in sign. 
To identify the impact of simplifying ROO on export, my specification is based on a standard 
difference-in-differences (DD) method. Specifically, I exploit two sources of variations in exports 
from Cambodia. The first is a difference between exports to EU markets (a treatment group) and 
exports to non-EU markets (a control group). The second is a difference in exports before and 
after the 2011 reform in ROO. By comparing changes in exports to EU markets before and after 
the year 2011 with changes in exports to non-EU markets before and after the year 2011, the DD 
method allows me to estimate the causal impact of liberal origin requirements on exports from 
                                                   
16 Knitted and woven garment exports are in HS Chapters 61 and 62, respectively. 
17 These include ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand in force from 2010, ASEAN-India in force from 
2010, ASEAN-Japan in force from 2008, and ASEAN-Korea RTAs in force from 2010. 
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Cambodia. Additionally, potential confounding factors are controlled for in my empirical model 
by including time-varying country characteristics, country fixed effects, and time-varying product 
fixed effects. These control variables help to isolate a variety of confounding factors from the 
impact of the reform on exports. Finally, the identification strategy relies on the assumption that 
both exports to EU markets and to non-EU markets would exhibit parallel trends in the absence 
of the EU’s reform in 2011. In section 4.1, I provide a graphical assessment to support the validity 
of the parallel trends assumption. 
 
3.3.  Data Sources 
Data on export in Cambodia are from the UN COMTRADE Database. I use trade statistics 
reported by Cambodia for the period 2007-2015. Data on GDP and GDP per capita come from 
the World Development Indicator by the World Bank. Data on simple average tariff rates come 
from UNCTAD TRAINS database. In the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database by 
the World Bank, I use data on effectively applied tariff rates, which are the lowest available tariffs 
such as preferential tariff rates. Otherwise, the MFN applied tariff rates are used. Information on 
RTAs are from the RTA database by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
 
4. Estimation Results 
This section presents the estimation results for exports in Cambodia. I start to describe export 
trends in treatment and control groups to check a parallel-trends assumption. After the main 
estimation results, I present a variety of robustness checks. 
 
4.1.  Export Trends in Treatment and Control Groups 
By employing a DD method in a regression model, I can disentangle a variety of confounding 
factors from a causal impact of simple ROO in the EU GSP after 2011. Nevertheless, the 
identification strategy relies crucially on the assumption that both exports to EU markets and to 
non-EU markets would exhibit parallel trends in the absence of the EU’s reform. Without the 
EU’s reform, export trends would need to move in tandem between treatment and control groups. 
If export trends are different between treatment and control groups in the absence of the EU’s 
reform, the DD method may not produce a valid estimate because export trends in non-EU 
markets may not well represent counterfactual export trends in the EU markets that would have 
prevailed in the absence of the EU’s reform. Although the parallel trends assumption is critical 
for the DD method, it is not generally possible to prove the validity of the assumption because the 
counterfactual export trends in the EU markets are not observable. 
To assess the empirical validity of the parallel trends, it is useful to describe export trends in 
treatment and control groups. To this end, we plot trends in the total values of garment exports 
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from Cambodia to treatment and control markets, respectively. The export values are normalized 
to take on a value of 100 in year 2010. Figure 2 shows export trends for knitted garments in HS 
chapter 61. Before the EU’s reform in 2011, both treatment and control groups exhibit similar 
export trends during the period 2007-2010. After 2011, the treatment group shows a sharp increase 
in the export trend over time. Although the control group also shows an upward export trend after 
2011, the export growth is substantially higher in the treatment group than in the control group 
after 2011. Additionally, Figure 3 presents export trends for woven garments in HS chapter 62. 
Before 2011, there is no apparent difference in export trends between both treatment and control 
groups. After 2011, the treatment group exhibits a substantially larger increase in the export trend 
than the control group does. Taken together, the graphical analysis lends considerable support for 
the parallel trends assumption, suggesting that export trends should be likely to move in tandem 
between treatment and control groups in the absence of the EU’s reform. 
[Figures 2 and 3 here] 
A plausible critique is that the export trends may simply capture an unobserved positive shock 
to imported consumer goods in the EU markets after 2011. If there were unobserved shocks to 
consumers’ tastes for apparel goods and/or consumer movements to buy imported products from 
developing economies, these shocks might sharply increase garment exports to the EU markets 
from Cambodia after 2011. To check the presence or absence of the unobserved positive shocks, 
I can use footwear exports as a fake treatment group. Since garment and footwear products are 
similar consumer goods, the unobserved positive shocks in the EU markets should also affect 
Cambodian footwear exports. On the other hand, the EU’s reform made little change in the 
product-specific origin-conferring criteria for footwear, implying that the EU’s reform should not 
have any discernable impact on footwear exports. 
If there were unobserved positive shocks to similar consumer goods in the EU markets, 
footwear exports would exhibit a sharp increase in the EU markets only after 2011. An alternative 
prediction is that export growth would be higher in the EU markets than in non-EU markets after 
2011. Figure 4 shows that footwear exports to EU and non-EU markets appear to move in tandem 
for the period 2007-2010. After 2011, the treatment group exhibits an upward export trend, but 
does not show a sudden increase over time. Moreover, the export growth is smaller in the 
treatment group than in the control group after 2011. These findings are not consistent with the 
hypothesis that unobserved positive shocks in the EU markets brought about a sharp increase in 
imported consumer goods such as garments and footwear. Thus, the observed export patterns for 
garment products should not be driven by the unobserved positive shocks to imported consumer 
goods in EU markets, thereby supporting the parallel trends assumption in garment exports. 
[Figure 4 here] 
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4.2.  Main Results 
This section presents the results of equation (1) estimated by an Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method. The summary statistics of the sample for garment exports are provided in Table 2. 
The baseline sample includes 28 EU countries in a treatment group and 85 non-EU countries in a 
control group. A list of these countries is in Appendix Table 1. I report standard errors that are 
corrected for clustering within the export market. 
[Tables 2 and 3 here] 
Column (1) of Table 3 shows the baseline result for knitted and woven garment products. The 
coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is significant and positive, consistent with the hypothesis that 
simplifying ROO in the EU GSP promoted significantly exports from a beneficiary country. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that garment exports to EU increased by 112% after 2011.18 The 
impact of the EU’s reform is substantially large in magnitude. Additionally, the coefficient of real 
GDP is not significant, but the coefficient of GDP per capita is significant and positive. The 
coefficient of tariff rates in export markets is significant and negative. The coefficient of RTAs is 
significant and positive. These results imply that garment exports are larger in higher income 
markets with RTAs and lower tariff rates.19 
Among EU member countries in the sample, Croatia participated in the EU for 2013. Since 
exports from Cambodia to Croatia may capture the effects of the new EU membership, I exclude 
Croatia from the sample.20 The result in column (2) shows that the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 
is significantly positive and similar in size, consistent with the fact that garment exports to Croatia 
were relatively small. Additionally, there might be a potential attrition issue caused by the 
differential loss of export observations between treatment and control groups. In column (3), I 
remove the observations in which export data are missing at least one year in each country and 
product pair. The specification is estimated for only country and product pairs with non-missing 
export data. The coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains significant and positive, implying that the 
results are robust to attrition. Finally, some small EU markets do not appear to support the parallel 
trends assumption.21 In column (4), I estimate the specification by excluding these small EU 
markets from the sample, thereby focusing on the impact of ROO on exports to larger EU markets. 
The coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  remains significant and positive, suggesting that garment 
exports increased by 219% in the larger EU markets. As I can reject statistically the equality of 
the coefficients of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 between columns (1) and (2), the EU’s reform would have the 
                                                   
18 A marginal effect in percentage changes is calculated by 100 × (exp(0.75) − 1). 
19 The results are robust to using trade-weighted tariff rates, as reported in Appendix Table 2. 
20 The value of garment exports from Cambodia to Croatia was merely 2.7 million USD for 2013. 
21 These countries include Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria. Their export trends are shown in Appendix Figures 1 and 2. 
These markets accounted for 8.3% of total garment exports from Cambodia to EU in 2010. 
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larger positive impact on exports to the larger EU markets, which imported a substantial share of 
garment products from Cambodia. Thus, the main results support the positive impact of the EU’s 
reform on garment exports in Cambodia.22 
Table 4 shows the results for exports by product. Specifically, I distinguish between knitted 
and woven garments and estimate the regression model separately for these products. Column (1) 
for knitted garments shows that the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is significant and positive, 
suggesting that knitted garment exports to EU increased by 166% after 2011. Column (2) for 
woven garment goods indicates that the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive, 
suggesting that woven garment exports to EU increased by 310% after 2011. Although I cannot 
reject the parameter equality of these estimated coefficients between columns (1) and (2), the 
larger marginal effect for woven garments is consistent with the prior finding that woven garment 
exports to EU from Bangladesh increased more rapidly than knitted garments (Curran and Nadvi, 
2015). The reason is that domestic supply tends to be more limited for woven textiles than for 
knitted textiles in developing economies. 23 Since the input choice may be more binding for 
woven garments than for knitted garments, simplifying ROO in the EU GSP had a larger impact 
on woven garment exports. 
[Table 4 here] 
As discussed previously, there is a concern that the positive impact of the EU’s reform on 
garment exports may capture unobserved positive shocks to imported consumer goods in EU, 
possibly leading to the positive coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖. To address this issue, I estimate the 
regression model for footwear exports, which were not affected by the EU’s reform in terms of 
origin requirements. Column (3) shows that the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is not significant, 
implying that footwear exports to EU markets did not increase significantly after 2011. 
Additionally, I estimate the model for cereal products such as rice, which are major agricultural 
export products in Cambodia. Since the EU’s reform made little change in origin requirements 
for wholly obtained products such as domestically produced rice, agricultural exports should not 
be affected by the EU’s reform. Column (4) shows that the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is positive, 
but not significant. Taken together, the positive impact of the EU’s reform on garment exports 
should not represent unobserved positive shocks in EU. 
 
 
                                                   
22 The results are robust to including country-product-level dummy variables, as reported in Appendix 
Table 3. 
23 Production of woven textiles requires relatively large capital investment for dyeing processes of 
woven fabric in order to mitigate an environmental impact of dyeing effluents and chemicals. 
Meanwhile, producers can use small circular knit machines to manufacture knitted textiles at a 
small scale, but may not need dyeing processes for the use of pre-dyed yarns. Thus, woven garment 
manufacturers rely more on imported textiles. 
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4.3.  Robustness Checks 
For a robustness check, I adopt a triple difference-in-differences (TD) method. An 
endogeneity critique is often made for a standard DD method to exploit only country-by-country 
differences in data (Besley and Case, 2000). By carefully documenting the EU’s reform processes, 
I argue that the policy change is plausibly exogenous to garment producers in Cambodia. 
Nevertheless, it is useful to check the robustness of main results to alternative specifications. 
Specifically, I estimate a following model for export market i, export product j, and year t: ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛾𝛾1𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (2) 
where 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is a dummy variable that takes on unity for knitted and woven exports, and 
zero otherwise. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is country-product-level fixed effects. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are time-varying country 
and product fixed effects, respectively.24 While garment exports are treated products, similar 
consumer products in HS chapters 63 and 64 are included as unaffected products in terms of ROO 
changes in the EU’s reform. The coefficient of the triple interaction term, 𝛾𝛾1, measures a change 
in garment exports to EU after 2011 as compared to the baseline level of country-by-product 
exports during the pre-reform period. 
Column (1) of Table 5 shows that the coefficient of the triple interaction is significant and 
positive. A marginal effect of the reform for garment exports is 84%. In column (2), I estimate 
equation (2) for the sample excluding smaller EU markets, as explained above. The result shows 
that the coefficient of the triple interaction remains significant and positive. Consistent with the 
results in Table 3, garment exports to the larger EU markets increased more significantly after 
2011. Taken together, I find that the baseline results are robust to a wide range of unobserved 
determinants of garment exports from Cambodia across products, export markets, and years. 
[Table 5 here] 
The previous results measure the average effect of the EU’s reform during the post-reform 
period. By interacting a dummy variable for EU markets with year dummy variables in equation 
(1), I can examine the timing of the effects. Column (3) of Table 5 shows that the coefficients of 
the interaction between EU markets and year dummies are positive and significant for 2013, 2014, 
and 2015. In column (4), I exclude smaller EU markets from the sample. The coefficients of the 
interaction terms remain positive and significant after 2012. The results indicate that the positive 
impacts tend to grow significantly over time. For instance, column (4) shows that the positive 
impact increases from 148% in 2012 to 381% in 2015. 
 
4.4.  Trade Substitution Effects 
An implicit assumption in a DD method is that there is no interference between units 
                                                   
24 As product-specific tariff rates in export markets are insignificant, I exclude the variable from the 
specification. 
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(Rosenbaum, 2007). Specifically, the assumption is that the EU’s reform did not affect Cambodian 
exports to non-EU markets, implying that exports to EU markets were not replaced by exports to 
non-EU markets in the wake of the reform. If there were substitution effects, an increase in exports 
to EU markets might partly originate from redirection of exports to non-EU markets. As a result, 
the estimated impact of the reform measures a causal impact of ROO changes on exports to EU 
markets as well as the substitution effects of exporting between EU and non-EU markets. From 
an assessment perspective, this issue indicates that the estimated impact should be interpreted 
more broadly.25 Nevertheless, it is not clear whether trade substitution effects are quantitatively 
important. 
I address this question in two ways. First, prior surveys on garment exporters in Cambodia 
show that exporters were not likely to shift their export markets over time, as shown in Appendix 
Table 4 (Asuyama et al., 2013; Yamagata, 2006). Any firm exporting to only Europe in 2002 did 
not export to North America in 2008, whereas any firm exporting to only North American in 2002 
did not export to Europe in 2008. Alternatively, firms exporting to multiple markets might shift 
the relative volume of their exports between markets. If capacity constraints were binding, they 
might replace product orders across markets to increase profits. However, the capacity expansion 
was unlikely to be binding because of small-scale capital investment in garment factories and an 
abundant supply of unskilled workers in Cambodia. Thus, firm-level surveys suggest that the 
EU’s reform would not strongly induce exporters to replace their product orders from non-EU 
markets. 
A second approach is to test the hypothesis that garment exports from Cambodia to non-EU 
markets would decrease after the EU’s reform in 2011. Specifically, I estimate a following model 
for export market i, export product j, and year t: ln𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝒁𝒁′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜹𝜹3 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖           (3) 
where 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛  is the value of garment exports from Cambodia to non-EU export market i. 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity after the year 2011, and zero otherwise. 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 
is a time-trend variable.26 If there were substitution effects, redirection of exports from non-EU 
to EU markets should lead to a relative decrease in exports to non-EU markets after 2011. This 
suggests that the coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 𝛿𝛿1, should be negative in sign. 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of equation (3). In column (1) for knitted and woven 
garments, the coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is positive, but not significant. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 is 
significant and positive, implying that exports to non-EU markets increased generally over time. 
                                                   
25 In a similar sense, other beneficiary countries affected by the EU’s reform would have an export 
response, so that competition effects in the EU markets affect garment exports from Cambodia, Such 
effects are part of the measured impact on Cambodia. 
26  This specification is similar to an empirical strategy in Heilmann (2016) to examine trade 
substitution effects of boycott. 
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Column (2) for knitted garments shows that the coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is not significant. In column 
(3) for woven garments, the coefficient of 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is negative, but not significant. These results 
suggest that exports to non-EU markets did not decline significantly after 2011. Taken together, I 
conclude that a sharp increase in garment exports to EU after 2011 should not be caused 
importantly by the redirection of exports that had been previously going to non-EU markets. 
[Table 6 here] 
 
4.5.  Export Variety and Price 
While the previous analysis has focused on an aggregate export response, there remains a 
question of whether increased exports are due to an increase in export variety and/or price. To 
address this question, I re-estimate equation (1) by using an export dummy variable and unit 
values as a dependent variable, respectively. These dependent variables are defined at the HS 6-
digit level of aggregation for garment exports in Cambodia. The sample includes 106 and 112 
product categories in HS Chapters 61 and 62, respectively. In this dataset, the export dummy 
variable takes on unity if garment exports at the 6 digit-level are positive, and zero otherwise. I 
define the unit values as a natural logarithm of the ratio of export values and the quantity of 
shipments in weight. 
Table 7 shows the results for these dependent variables. In column (1) for the export dummy, 
the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is positive, but not significant. The probability to export garment 
goods to EU did not significantly change after 2011. In column (2), I exclude smaller EU markets 
from the sample. The coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive, suggesting that there 
was a significant increase in the probability to export garment products to larger EU markets after 
2011. The aggregate impact on export values are larger for the larger EU markets, an increase in 
export variety should partly contribute to the larger export impacts. Additionally, column (3) for 
the unit values shows that the coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is significant and negative. Column (4) 
shows the result for excluding smaller EU markets. The coefficient of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 remains 
significant and negative. The price of Cambodian garment exports to the EU markets decreased 
by 9.5% after 2011. In the larger EU markets, the export price declined by 12.2%. Taken together, 
these results suggest that the EU’s reform significantly increased a quantity of garment exports 
from Cambodia to EU, with a pronounced increase in export variety for the larger EU markets. 
[Table 7 here] 
 
5. The Impact on Imported Intermediate Inputs 
Discussions up to this point have demonstrated that Cambodian garment exports to EU 
markets significantly increased after the EU’s reform in ROO for 2011. A main channel is the 
flexible use of intermediate inputs imported from any market, which should reduce the costs of 
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garment manufacture in Cambodia. This finding raises an important question of how the EU’s 
reform affects international sourcing patterns of intermediate inputs for garment manufacture in 
Cambodia. In this section, I seek to shed light on this issue. 
 
5.1.  Descriptive Analysis 
I start to describe an import pattern of textiles in Cambodia.27 Table 8 presents the value of 
textile imports to Cambodia from major exporters, including China, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Taiwan, ASEAN, and EU. Among these markets, China accounted for the largest textile imports 
in Cambodia. For instance, fabric imports from China increased from 695 million USD in 2010 
to 2,161 million USD in 2015. The share of fabric imports from China increased from 42.1% in 
2010 to 62.6% in 2015. The share of yarn imports from China also increased from 24.9% in 2010 
to 76.3% in 2015. As discussed in Staritz (2011), China is a key market for imported intermediate 
inputs used to manufacture clothing in Cambodia. Meanwhile, there was an increase in fabric 
imports from other markets such as Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. However, the relative 
importance of these markets declined over time, suggesting that textile industries in China should 
be more competitive in supplying textile inputs for foreign markets. The key implication is that 
the EU’s reform in 2011 might bring about a sharp increase in textile imports from China. In the 
previous ROO, duty-free access to EU markets was given in certain conditions to the garment 
products that use imported textiles from EU and ASEAN markets. More liberal ROO in the EU 
GSP should have little impact on textile imports from these markets. Meanwhile, preferential 
treatment under the new ROO was given to the garment products that use imported textiles from 
third markets such as China. Thus, a sharp increase in garment exports to EU would lead to a 
larger increase in textile imports from China than those from other markets applicable to rules of 
cumulation. 
[Table 8 here] 
To check this implication, I plot trends in textile imports to Cambodia, with the value of 
imports being normalized at a value of 100 in 2010. Figure 5 shows import trends for fabric. 
Fabric imports from China increased sharply after the EU’s reform in 2011. This change is in 
stark contrast with a moderate change in fabric imports from Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and ASEAN. Additionally, Figure 6 shows a rapid increase in yarn imports from China. While the 
EU’s reform should reduce a demand for yarn imports to produce textiles at a local plant, an 
increase in yarn imports may be due to the fact that yarn and fabric are jointly used to manufacture 
clothing. Taken together, the descriptive analysis suggests that the EU’s reform led to a substantial 
                                                   
27 Following Staritz (2011), I compute the value of fabric imports by aggregating the commodities in 
HS codes 5208-12, 5309-11, 5407-08, 5512-16, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60. The value of yarn imports is 
the sum of the commodities in HS codes 50, 51, 5201-07, 5301-08, 5401-06, and 5501-11. 
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increase in textile imports from China. 
[Figures 5 and 6 here] 
 
5.2.  Regression Analysis 
To formally assess the role of China in textile imports for Cambodia, I estimate a following 
model for import market i, textile product j, and year t: ln 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝜃𝜃1𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + ∑ 𝜃𝜃2𝑚𝑚𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜽𝜽3 + 𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (4) 
where 𝐼𝐼𝐺𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is the value of imports in Cambodia from import market i; m indicates major 
import markets including (i) China, (ii) Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan, (iii) ASEAN, and 
(ⅳ) EU. 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for import market m. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is a dummy 
variable that takes on unity after 2011. 𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is a vector of variables on import-market 
characteristics, including GDP, GDP per capita, RTAs, geographic distance, and geographic 
contiguity. 𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for fabric goods, and zero for yarn 
goods. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖  is a year fixed effect. Finally, 𝐺𝐺𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error term. 
The coefficients of interest are 𝜃𝜃1𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 and 𝜃𝜃2𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖. The former measures the relative size 
of textile imports from China, and the latter measures a change in textile imports from China after 
2011. Table 9 presents the results of equation (4) estimated by OLS for the sample period 2007-
2015, with standard errors corrected for clustering in the import market. Appendix Table 6 
presents the summary statistics of textile imports. Column (1) of Table 9 shows that the coefficient 
of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 is significant and positive. The coefficient of the interaction term 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is 
also significant and positive. These results implies that China is a key market for textile imports 
in Cambodia and accounted for a significant increase in textile imports after the EU’s reform in 
2011. The coefficient of the import market dummy for Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan is 
significant and positive, but the coefficient of the interaction term 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is not 
significant. As the coefficients of the interactions for other markets are not significant, textile 
imports from other markets did not increase significantly after 2011. 
[Table 9 here] 
Columns (2) and (3) present the results separately for fabric and yarn goods. The coefficients 
of 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖  and 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  are significant and positive in both specifications. The 
estimated coefficients suggest that fabric and yarn imports from China increased by 90% and 
348% after 2011, respectively. Taken together, I find that imported textiles from China 
significantly increased after 2011. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that more liberal 
ROO in the EU GSP encourage the use of most competitively priced inputs imported from third 
markets such as China when garment exporters exploit preferential market access. 
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6. The Impact on Inward FDI 
A sharp increase in demand for garment exports to EU after 2011 could be met by an increase 
in production capacity for existing garment factories through an expansion of production lines 
and hiring more garment workers. However, the expansion of garment production can be driven 
not only by the existing garment factories in 2011, but by newly-established garment factories 
after 2011. Given that many garment factories were owned by foreign investors (Yamagata, 2006), 
it is a crucial question whether the EU’s reform contributes to attract inward FDI projects and 
how the impacts differ by sectors. This section sheds light on the response of inward FDI in 
Cambodia. 
 
6.1.  Descriptive Analysis 
The EU’s reform in ROO for 2011 removed restrictions on intermediate input sourcing for 
garment manufacture in Cambodia. Garment producers could exploit a wide range of intermediate 
inputs imported from most efficient markets after 2011 and still maintain preferential market 
access to the EU markets. Since the flexibility in input sourcing should improve an investment 
climate in Cambodia, the reform would attract foreign investors in a garment sector. On the other 
hand, the previous ROO generally required the use of locally manufactured fabric from yarn to 
qualify for preferential access, although rules of cumulation allowed for the use of imported 
fabrics from certain markets such as EU and ASEAN. The content requirement for local inputs 
provided an incentive for foreign investors to manufacture textiles at a local production plant in 
Cambodia. However, the removal of the local input requirements should reduce an incentive for 
foreign producers to invest in a textile sector and build up the manufacturing base of textile 
suppliers. Consequently, simplifying ROO should produce two contrasting effects on inward FDI 
flows across these sectors; (i) FDI inflows should increase in the garment sector after 2011, and 
(ii) FDI inflows should decrease in the textile sector after 2011.28 
To examine whether these hypotheses are consistent with a pattern of FDI inflows in 
Cambodia, I use data on the factory registration by the Cambodian Ministry of Industry and 
Handicraft. There is information on registered factories after the year 1994, including main 
products, the year of establishment, location, country of investors, and capital. Figure 7 presents 
a trend in FDI flows for the period 2007-2015. The total amount of capital investment by foreign 
investors is shown for garment and textile sectors, respectively. As a benchmark, I also show the 
average capital investment in all manufacturing sectors. As compared with the average FDI 
inflows, FDI inflows in the garment sector increased sharply after 2011. By contrast, FDI inflows 
in the textile sector remained at a lower level after 2011 than the average FDI inflows. These 
findings are consistent with the predicted impacts of simplifying ROO on inward FDI. 
                                                   
28 For a theoretical discussion on a relationship between ROO and FDI, see Mukunoki (2017). 
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[Figure 7 here] 
 
6.2.  Regression Analysis 
To formally estimate the impact of the EU’s reform on inward FDI flows in garment and 
textile sectors, I specify a following model for sector s, parent country p, and year t: ln𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = 𝜌𝜌1𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌2𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜌𝜌3𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 + 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖      (5) 
where 𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖   is the value of foreign capital inflows in sector s from parent country p to 
Cambodia in year t. 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for a garment sector. 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 is a 
dummy variable that takes on unity after 2011. 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 is a dummy variable that takes on unity for a 
textile sector. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is the level of statutory minimum wages for workers in sector s for year t. 
Data on minimum wages in Cambodia are taken from the Cambodian Garment and Footwear 
Sector Bulletin by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2016, Table 1). Cambodia’s 
minimum wages apply only to textile, garment, and footwear manufacturing sectors. The 
minimum wages were introduced in 1997 at 40 USD per month and have been adjusted several 
times. In January 2015, the minimum wages increased to 128 USD per month. Because the 
minimum wages do not apply to other sectors, I set a value of zero in 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for the other sectors. 
Finally, 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 is an sector-level fixed effect, and 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 is a time-varying parent-country fixed effect. 
𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  is an error term. 
The coefficients of interest are 𝜌𝜌1  and 𝜌𝜌2 . I predict a positive sign for 𝜌𝜌1  if foreign 
investors in a garment sector responded positively to the EU’s reform. On the other hand, I predict 
a negative sign for 𝜌𝜌2 if foreign investors in a textile sector responded negatively. Table 10 
presents the estimation results of equation (5) by OLS, with the summary statistics of the sample 
given in Appendix Table 7. The sample includes the registered investment projects by foreign 
investors from 29 parent countries in 21 manufacturing sectors for the period 1994-2015. I report 
standard errors corrected for clustering in sector and parent country. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient of the interaction term, 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, is significant and positive, suggesting that FDI 
inflows in a garment sector increased by 86% after 2011. By contrast, the coefficient of the 
interaction, 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, is significant and negative, implying that FDI inflows in a textile sector 
decreased by 75% after 2011. 29  Consistent with the hypothesis, these results show that 
simplifying ROO in the EU GSP have a positive impact on FDI inflows in the garment sector, but 
a negative effect on those in the textile sector.30 Additionally, the coefficient of minimum wage 
is negative, but not significant, suggesting that a gradual increase in sector-specific minimum 
                                                   
29 Estimating a specification with an interaction term of leather/footwear-sector dummy and 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 , I 
found the insignificant coefficient of the interaction, consistent with the fact that the EU’ reform made 
little change in ROO for leather and footwear products. 
30 The positive impact on garment FDI is consistent with the finding in Estevadeordal et al. (2006) 
that FDI in Mexico during the post-NAFTA period increased in sectors with flexible ROO. 
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wages had little effect on FDI inflows. 
[Table 10 here] 
As the previous section highlights a large role of China in textile imports to Cambodia, a 
related question is whether Chinese investors responded more strongly to the reform. 31  To 
address this question, I re-specify equation (5) by including triple interaction terms, 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 ×
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  and 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 , separately in the model; 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  is a dummy 
variable for Chinese investors. To account for other determinants of FDI inflows by Chinese 
investors, I drop 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠 and 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 from the specification, and include the following variables: 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠, 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠, 
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠, 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖, 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠, and 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠. 
Column (2) shows the result for the specification with an interaction, 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠. 
The coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 is significant and positive. The estimated coefficient suggests 
that Chinese direct investment in a garment sector is significantly larger by 371% as compared 
with other investors from different nationalities. However, the coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 ×
𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 is not significant, implying that the response of Chinese investors was not significantly 
different from other parent countries. Additionally, column (3) presents the result for the 
specification with an interaction, 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠 . The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  is 
negative and insignificant. The coefficient of 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠 × 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 × 𝐶𝐶ℎ𝐹𝐹𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑠  is positive, but not 
significant. The estimated coefficient suggests that Chinese direct investment in a textile sector is 
not significantly larger than other parent countries. There is little evidence to indicate Chinese 
investors in the textile sector strongly and negatively responded to the EU’s reform for 2011. 
Taken together, the results highlight that textile imports increased significantly only from the 
Chinese market after 2011, but there was not a pronounced surge in Chinese FDI inflows in the 
garment sector. Foreign investors from both China and other parent countries established new 
garment factories. 
 
7. Conclusion 
Stringent origin requirements in GSP programs are widely considered as a key reason for the 
low utilization rate of trade preferences by beneficiary countries because imported inputs from 
the lowest-cost third markets are generally restricted to obtain preferential treatment. After the 
new regulation to simplify ROO for the EU GSP in 2011, there was a sharp increase in exports 
from beneficiaries to EU requesting preferential access. This paper seeks to evaluate the impact 
of the EU’s reform in ROO on international trade and FDI in a beneficiary country, Cambodia. 
Specifically, this paper focuses on a clear change in origin-conferring criteria for garment 
products in LDCs from two-stage to one-stage processing. More liberal origin requirements for 
                                                   
31 Appendix Figure 3 shows the total amount of capital investment in a garment sector by foreign 
investors for major parent countries. 
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garment products should produce a significant influence on the garment sector in Cambodia, 
which largely relied on imported textiles for the limited domestic capacity of textile inputs. 
The empirical analysis demonstrates that garment exports from Cambodia to the EU markets 
increased significantly after 2011. The positive impact is larger for garment exports to larger EU 
markets. Textile imports such as yarn and fabric from China increased significantly after 2011, 
suggesting that simplifying ROO in the EU GSP encouraged the use of competitively priced 
inputs from third markets to qualify for preferential market access. Moreover, a sharp increase in 
demand for garment exports was also met by newly opened garment factories after 2011. As more 
flexible sourcing contributes to improve an investment climate for foreign investors in the 
garment sector, FDI inflows in a garment sector increased significantly after 2011. However, the 
EU’s reform removes an incentive for input suppliers to engage in local textile production, so that 
FDI inflows in a textile sector decreased significantly after 2011. The EU’s reform in ROO 
brought about a substantial impact on trade and FDI in Cambodia. 
The findings provide crucial policy implications for preferential trade access given by 
developed economies to promote an export industry in developing economies. While duty-free 
access is a key element to support the rapid growth of manufactured exports in developing 
economies, the restrictiveness of origin requirements in preferential trade schemes has a 
significant impact on whether developing economies benefit from preferential access. 
Specifically, origin-conferring criteria should be liberal for beneficiary countries with limited 
domestic supply capacity. To deliver the expected benefits of preferential access, policy makers 
must carefully design origin requirements to account for local and global supply chains in 
developing economies. However, liberal ROO may also produce a negative impact on local 
supplying industry by removing an incentive to use locally produced inputs. It is crucial to take 
into account a negative consequence on a local industry for setting appropriate origin 
requirements in preferential schemes. 
Promising research questions are unexplored in this paper. First, it remains a question 
whether simple ROO would promote exports from any beneficiary countries. A useful extension 
is an empirical assessment of other beneficiaries under the EU GSP. Another extension is to 
examine Interim Economic Partnership Agreements (IEPA) between EU and African, Caribbean 
and Pacific (ACP) countries because origin requirements for garment products in the IEPA also 
changed from two-stage transformation to one-stage transformation for ACP countries. These 
policy changes provide a useful natural experiment to assess the heterogeneous impacts across 
beneficiaries. Second, a related question is whether simplifying ROO in the EU GSP also affects 
trade in non-garment products such as bicycles. These products involve a different pattern of 
global value chains and domestic production capacity in developing economies. It is crucial to 
shed light on heterogeneous impacts across products. Finally, GSP programs aim to promote 
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industrialization and job creation in developing economies through preferential access to larger 
export markets. As Ornelas (2016) points out, there is only weak empirical support on the 
effectiveness of GSP policies in promoting development. Other consequences such as domestic 
employment changes are largely unexplored. Since the EU’s reform in ROO provides a plausibly 
exogenous and large shock to developing economies such as Cambodia, a useful extension is to 
estimate an employment effect of trade shocks due to the reform. 
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Figure 1. Utilization Rate of Duty-Free Garment Imports in EU from Cambodia 
 
Notes: Knitted and woven garments indicate the garments in HS chapters 61 and 62, respectively; 
the utilization rate is computed as a share of duty-free import in the total import that entered EU 
markets under duty-free and MFN rate. 
Source: EUROSTAT 
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Figure 2. Export Trends in Knitted Garments 
 
Notes: The value of knitted garment exports is normalized to take a value of 100 for 2010; the 
total exports from Cambodia to EU markets and non-EU markets are shown, respectively. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Figure 3. Export Trends in Woven Garments 
 
Notes: The value of woven garment exports is normalized to take a value of 100 for 2010; the 
total exports from Cambodia to EU markets and non-EU markets are shown, respectively. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Figure 4. Export Trends in Footwear 
 
Notes: The value of footwear exports is normalized to take a value of 100 for 2010; the total 
exports from Cambodia to EU markets and non-EU markets are shown, respectively. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search
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Figure 5. Import Trends in Fabric 
 
Notes: Fabric includes the commodities in HS 5208-12, 5309-11, 5407-08, 5512-16, 56, 57, 58, 
59, and 60; the value of fabric imports are normalized to take a value of 100 for 2010; HKT 
indicates the total fabric imports from Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Figure 6. Import Trends in Yarn 
 
Notes: Yarn includes the commodities in HS 50, 51, 5201-07, 5301-08, 5401-06, and 5501-11; 
the value of yarn imports are normalized to take a value of 100 for 2010; HKT indicates the total 
fabric imports from Hong Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Figure 7. Trends in Inward FDI Flows 
 
Notes: Capital is measured in millions of U.S. dollars; garment and textile indicate the total 
amount of capital by foreign investors in garment and textile sectors, respectively; Average 
indicates the average amount of capital by foreign investors in all manufacturing sectors. 
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Table 1. Rules of Origin under EU GSP for Cambodia's Garment Products 
  Old Rules New Rules 
Date to apply new regulation 1st January 2011 
Origin requirements 
 Products Garment products in HS chapters 61 and 62 
 Beneficiary country Cambodia (Least developing country status) 
 Processing stages Two stages Single stage 
  Manufacture of yarn Not required Not required 
  Manufacture of fabric Required Not required 
  Manufacture of clothing Required Required 
Use of imported fabric   
 From European Union Conditionally allowed 
No restriction on the use 
of imported textiles from 
any markets 
 From ASEAN Conditionally allowed(a) 
 From other markets  
  China 
Not allowed 
  Hong Kong 
  Taiwan 
    South Korea 
Notes: (a) indicates rules of regional cumulation, which allow for the use of imported textiles 
if garment producers in Cambodia add the larger value than the highest customs value of input 
fabric originating in any one of the other countries in ASEAN, except for Myanmar; the EC 
granted the derogations from the GSP ROO for certain textile products originating from 
Cambodia, which allowed for the use of woven fabric (woven items) or yarn (knitted items) 
imported from countries belonging to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC) or to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EC Partnership Agreement under 
certain quantitative restrictions. 
Source: Author's compilation based on UNCTAD (2013) and Commission Regulations (EU) 
No 1063/2010 of 18 November 2010. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Garment Exports 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Export 1,169 6.08 3.30 0 14.48 
EU × Post 1,169 0.20 0.40 0 1 
Log Real GDP 1,169 5.51 1.73 0.16 9.72 
Log GDP per capita 1,169 9.58 1.19 5.74 11.63 
Tariff rates 1,169 8.31 11.75 0 50 
Regional trade agreements 1,169 0.05 0.21 0 1 
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Table 3. Estimation Results of Garment Exports 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU × Post 0.75* 0.71* 0.81* 1.16** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) 
Log Real GDP -0.14 0.33 2.62 -0.97 
 (2.04) (2.08) (2.15) (1.99) 
Log GDP per capita 3.54+ 3.29 1.32 3.57* 
 (1.95) (1.99) (2.01) (1.76) 
Tariff rates -0.035** -0.035** -0.038** -0.036** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Regional trade agreements 1.36** 1.37** 1.39** 1.33** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,169 1,156 850 1,043 
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.89 0.89 
Sample All 
Excluding 
Croatia 
Excluding 
panel units 
with missing 
exports 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
Notes: Garment exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 
62; small EU markets include Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria; parentheses report standard errors corrected 
for clustering in export markets; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results of Exports by Product 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample 
Knitted 
Garment 
Woven 
Garment 
Footwear Cereal 
HS Chapter 61 62 64 10 
EU × Post 0.98* 1.41** -0.55 0.51 
 (0.39) (0.48) (0.34) (0.69) 
Log Real GDP 0.27 -1.32 5.00* 2.72 
 (2.96) (2.83) (2.46) (6.69) 
Log GDP per capita 1.61 4.76* -4.24+ -2.49 
 (2.78) (2.19) (2.49) (7.81) 
Tariff rates -0.038** -0.032 -0.0095 -0.0065 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.025) (0.011) 
Regional trade agreements 0.93** 1.77** -0.029 -0.031 
 (0.25) (0.55) (0.55) (1.45) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 591 452 568 279 
R-squared 0.94 0.88 0.88 0.82 
Notes: Columns (1) and (2) exclude small EU markets, including Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria; 
parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in export markets; constant is not 
reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5. Estimation Results of Alternative Specifications 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
HS Chapter 61-64 61-64 61, 62 61, 62 
EU × Garment × Post 0.61+ 0.97*   
 (0.35) (0.39)   
EU × Year 2011   0.43 0.59 
   (0.36) (0.41) 
EU × Year 2012   0.57 0.91* 
   (0.36) (0.38) 
EU × Year 2013   1.05** 1.60** 
   (0.37) (0.36) 
EU × Year 2014   0.85* 1.51** 
   (0.40) (0.41) 
EU × Year 2015   1.06** 1.57** 
   (0.36) (0.40) 
Control variables   Yes Yes 
Country dummy   Yes Yes 
Country-product dummy Yes Yes   
Country-year dummy Yes Yes   
Product-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 2,145 1,962 1,169 1,043 
R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.88 0.90 
Sample All 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
All 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
Notes: Control variables include GDP, GDP per capita, tariff rates, and new RTAs; small EU 
markets include Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria; parentheses report standard errors corrected for 
clustering in export markets; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6. Estimation Results of Export Substitution Effects 
Dependent variable: log of exports to non-EU markets 
  (1) (2) (3) 
HS Chapter 61, 62 61 62 
Post 0.041 0.10 -0.029 
 (0.18) (0.12) (0.40) 
Time Trend 0.17** 0.15* 0.18* 
 (0.048) (0.059) (0.080) 
Log Real GDP -0.36 1.28 -1.26 
 (2.27) (3.44) (3.00) 
Log GDP per capita 3.47+ 0.75 5.83* 
 (1.94) (3.04) (2.37) 
Tariff rates -0.035** -0.039** -0.028 
 (0.013) (0.011) (0.026) 
Regional trade agreements 1.25** 0.92** 1.55** 
 (0.33) (0.25) (0.50) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Product dummy Yes   
No. of observations 767 442 325 
R-squared 0.89 0.95 0.87 
Notes: Parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in export markets; constant 
is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Estimation Results of Export Variety and Price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Export dummy Log unit values 
EU × Post 0.019 0.045** -0.10** -0.13** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.038) (0.035) 
Log Real GDP -0.028 -0.060 0.69* 0.59+ 
 (0.068) (0.067) (0.34) (0.34) 
Log GDP per capita 0.067 0.097 -0.52 -0.44 
 (0.068) (0.066) (0.35) (0.32) 
Tariff rates -0.0021** -0.0021** 0.0053* 0.0053* 
 (0.00068) (0.00067) (0.0024) (0.0024) 
Regional trade agreements 0.062** 0.062** -0.013 -0.0098 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.067) (0.066) 
Country dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 175,276 153,694 22,244 20,631 
R-squared 0.43 0.44 0.37 0.37 
Sample All 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
All 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
Notes: The sample includes export products at the HS 6-digit level in HS Chapters 61 and 62; 
small EU markets include Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Estonia, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria; parentheses report standard errors corrected 
for clustering in export markets; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Textile Imports in Cambodia 
Textile Type Fabric Yarn 
Exporter 2010 2015 2010 2015 
China 694.5 2,161.2 36.0 174.3 
 (42.1) (62.6) (24.9) (76.3) 
Hong Kong 325.4 383.9 71.3 19.0 
 (19.7) (11.1) (49.2) (8.3) 
South Korea 69.6 104.3 1.0 1.5 
 (4.2) (3.0) (0.7) (0.6) 
Taiwan 267.0 375.0 14.1 4.0 
 (16.2) (10.9) (9.8) (1.7) 
ASEAN 225.1 302.7 8.3 19.6 
 (13.6) (8.8) (5.7) (8.6) 
EU 10.0 27.1 0.6 2.0 
 (0.6) (0.8) (0.4) (0.9) 
Total 1,650.8 3,449.7 144.8 228.5 
Notes: Figures indicate the value of imports in million USD; parentheses show a percentage 
share of the corresponding import in the total import; fabric indicates the commodities in HS 
5208-12, 5309-11, 5407-08, 5512-16, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60; yarn includes the commodities 
in HS 50, 51, 5201-07, 5301-08, 5401-06, and 5501-11. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Table 9. Estimation Results of Textile Imports 
Dependent variable: log of imports 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample Fabric & Yarn Fabric Yarn 
China 3.86** 5.04** 2.43** 
 (0.86) (1.17) (0.87) 
China × Post 0.95** 0.64* 1.50* 
 (0.28) (0.32) (0.66) 
HKG/KOR/TWN 3.97** 5.08** 2.55** 
 (0.65) (0.74) (0.90) 
HKG/KOR/TWN × Post -0.27 -0.029 -0.26 
 (0.41) (0.37) (0.84) 
ASEAN -1.06 -0.20 -2.30* 
 (0.97) (1.29) (1.08) 
ASEAN × Post 0.25 0.80 -0.15 
 (0.45) (0.52) (0.92) 
EU -0.47 -0.76 0.27 
 (0.67) (0.83) (0.97) 
EU × Post 0.49 0.98 -0.55 
 (0.58) (0.61) (1.31) 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Fabric dummy Yes   
No. of observations 679 455 224 
R-squared 0.56 0.57 0.62 
Notes: Parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in import markets; control 
variables include log real GDP, log GDP per capita, RTAs, geographic distance, and 
geographic contiguity; constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 10. Estimation Results of Inward FDI 
Dependent variable: log of capital 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Garment × Post 0.62+ 0.61+ 0.53+ 
 (0.36) (0.32) (0.31) 
Textile × Post -1.39* -0.70* -0.72+ 
 (0.62) (0.33) (0.37) 
China  -0.22 0.52 
  (0.25) (0.41) 
China × Post  0.92* 0.40 
  (0.37) (0.37) 
Garment  0.054 0.32 
  (0.25) (0.26) 
Garment × China  1.55**  
  (0.30)  
Garment × Post × China   0.24  
  (0.45)  
Textile  -0.36 -0.22 
  (0.25) (0.29) 
Textile × China   -0.72 
   (0.46) 
Textile × Post × China   0.28 
   (0.49) 
Minimum wage -0.0014 0.0062+ 0.0063+ 
 (0.0096) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Sector dummy Yes   
Country-year dummy Yes   
Year dummy  Yes Yes 
No. of observations 456 456 485 
R-squared 0.61 0.29 0.25 
Notes: Parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in sector and country; 
constant is not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix Figure 1. Garment Export Trends for Small EU Markets 
 
Notes: The value of garment exports is normalized to take a value of 100 for 2010; the total exports 
from Cambodia to Luxembourg, Netherlands, Ireland, and Greece are shown. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Appendix Figure 2. Garment Export Trends for Very Small EU Markets 
 
Notes: The value of garment exports is measured in thousand USD; the total exports from 
Cambodia to Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, and Bulgaria are shown. 
Source: UN COMTRADE and Taiwan Trade Statistics Search 
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Appendix Figure 3. FDI Flows in Garment Sector from Major Parent Countries 
 
Notes: Capital is measured in millions of U.S. dollars; major parent countries for inward FDI in 
garment sector accounted for 97.9% of the total capital investment during the period 1994-2015. 
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Appendix Table 1. List of Sample Countries 
Afghanistan Czech Republic Kuwait Qatar 
Albania Denmark Latvia Romania 
Algeria Dominican Republic Lebanon Russian Federation 
Angola Ecuador Lesotho Saudi Arabia 
Antigua and Barbuda Egypt, Arab Rep. Lithuania Sierra Leone 
Argentina El Salvador Luxembourg Singapore 
Armenia Estonia Macao Slovak Republic 
Australia Ethiopia (excludes Eritrea) Macedonia, FYR Slovenia 
Austria Finland Madagascar South Africa 
Azerbaijan France Malaysia Spain 
Bahrain Germany Malta Sri Lanka 
Belarus Greece Mauritius Suriname 
Belgium Guatemala Mexico Swaziland 
Belize Haiti Moldova Sweden 
Benin Honduras Mongolia Switzerland 
Bolivia Hong Kong, China Morocco Taiwan, China 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Hungary Nepal Thailand 
Brazil Iceland Netherlands Tunisia 
Brunei India New Zealand Turkey 
Bulgaria Indonesia Nicaragua Ukraine 
Cameroon Ireland Norway United Arab Emirates 
Canada Israel Pakistan United Kingdom 
Chile Italy Panama United States 
China Jamaica Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
Colombia Japan Paraguay Venezuela 
Congo, Rep. Jordan Peru Vietnam 
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Philippines  
Croatia Kenya Poland  
Cyprus Korea, Rep. Portugal   
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Appendix Table 2. Estimation Results for Weighted Tariff Rates 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU × Post 0.75* 0.71* 0.81* 1.16** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.35) (0.34) 
Log Real GDP -0.14 0.33 2.61 -0.97 
 (2.05) (2.08) (2.15) (2.00) 
Log GDP per capita 3.57+ 3.32+ 1.37 3.60* 
 (1.95) (1.99) (2.01) (1.77) 
Trade-weighted tariff rates -0.034** -0.034** -0.036** -0.035** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Regional trade agreements 1.37** 1.39** 1.41** 1.34** 
 (0.35) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35) 
Country-product dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,169 1,156 850 1,043 
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.89 
Sample All 
Excluding 
Croatia 
Excluding the 
markets with 
missing exports 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
Notes: Garment exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 
62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in export markets; constant is 
not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
53 
 
 
Appendix Table 3. Estimation Results for Additional Fixed Effects 
Dependent variable: log of exports 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
EU × Post 0.80* 0.77* 0.81* 1.18** 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.36) (0.35) 
Log Real GDP 0.31 0.85 2.61 -0.12 
 (2.17) (2.17) (2.22) (2.23) 
Log GDP per capita 2.92 2.62 1.37 2.69 
 (2.07) (2.09) (2.07) (1.95) 
Tariff rates -0.034* -0.034* -0.037** -0.036** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) 
Regional trade agreements 1.34** 1.35** 1.39** 1.34** 
 (0.37) (0.37) (0.35) (0.38) 
Country-product dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Product-year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of observations 1,169 1,156 850 1,043 
R-squared 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.93 
Sample All 
Excluding 
Croatia 
Excluding the 
markets with 
missing 
exports 
Excluding 
small EU 
markets 
Notes: Garment exports include knitted and woven garment products in HS chapters 61 and 
62; parentheses report standard errors corrected for clustering in export markets; constant is 
not reported; **, *, and + denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table 4. The Number of Garment Exporters by Destination Markets 
  
Destination markets in 2008 
North 
America 
North 
America 
North 
America 
Europe Europe Other 
Destination markets  
in 2002 
  Europe Other   Other   
North America  9 3 0 0 0 0 
North America Europe 6 10 0 1 0 2 
North America Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Europe  0 1 0 1 0 0 
Europe Other 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Other   1 0 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Figures indicate the number of sample firms that can be linked between 2003 and 2009 
and show information on their export destination markets for these years; 164 and 122 firms 
were surveyed in 2002 and 2008, respectively. 
Source: Asuyama et al. (2013) and Yamagata (2006).  
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Appendix Table 5. Summary Statistics of Export Variety and Price 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A: Export Variety 
Export dummy 175,276 0.13 0.34 0 1 
EU × Post 175,276 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Log Real GDP 175,276 4.91 1.88 0.12 9.72 
Log GDP per capita 175,276 9.37 1.25 5.74 11.63 
Tariff rates 175,276 9.11 11.59 0 50 
Regional trade agreements 175,276 0.04 0.19 0 1 
Panel B: Export Price 
Log unit values 22,244 3.01 0.73 -3.04 7 
EU × Post 22,244 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Log Real GDP 22,244 6.50 1.51 0.16 9.72 
Log GDP per capita 22,244 9.99 0.97 6.00 11.63 
Tariff rates 22,244 6.32 10.83 0 50 
Regional trade agreements 22,244 0.08 0.27 0 1 
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Appendix Table 6. Summary Statistics of Textile Imports 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log Import 679 -1.38 3.61 -10.64 7.68 
China 679 0.03 0.16 0 1 
China × Post 679 0.01 0.12 0 1 
HKG/KOR/TWN 679 0.08 0.27 0 1 
HKG/KOR/TWN × Post 679 0.04 0.21 0 1 
EU 679 0.26 0.44 0 1 
EU × Post 679 0.16 0.37 0 1 
ASEAN 679 0.19 0.39 0 1 
ASEAN × Post 679 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Log Real GDP 679 5.67 1.95 -0.40 9.72 
Log GDP per capita 679 9.31 1.49 5.93 11.63 
Log Distance 679 8.41 0.96 6.25 9.89 
Geographic contiguity 679 0.06 0.25 0 1 
Regional trade agreements 679 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Fabric dummy 679 0.67 0.47 0 1 
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Appendix Table 7. Summary Statistics of Inward FDI 
Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log capital 456 15.45 1.30 9.90 19.19 
Garment × Post 456 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Textile × Post 456 0.03 0.18 0 1 
China 456 0.20 0.40 0 1 
China × Post 456 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Garment 456 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Garment × China 456 0.04 0.21 0 1 
Garment × Post × China  456 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Textile 456 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Textile × China 456 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Textile × Post × China 456 0.01 0.10 0 1 
Minimum wage 456 31.47 35.74 0 128 
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